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The connection between single species and ecosystems 
LAWRENCE B. SLOBODKIN 
Department of Biology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, New York 11794, USA 
Ecosystem level models are motivated by some combination of scientific and practical concerns. 
Those models motivated by practical concerns are likely to bear little historical relation to 
previous models. Mechanisms of interaction between particular species and their ecosystems 
vary enormously. Some species literally construct their own ecosystems. Others have more or 
less complex and important interactions with other species so that their presence or absence may 
alter the ecosystem. Prior information about the natural history of particular species can make 
ecosystem investigations quicker, cheaper, and more effective. The optimal resource for 
preparing to deal with the unlimited diversity of questions asked of ecologists would be a large' 
computerized databank of natural history observations for as many species as possible. 
Introduction 
"What can be learned about ecosystems from single species?" has been the focus of several 
recent symposia and congresses. The question seems superficially similar to the question: What 
can be learned about organisms from studying single cells or about a population from single 
organisms? Obviously there are mechanistic connections between cells and organisms, and 
between individuals and populations. Aren't there mechanistic connections between 
ecosystems and their component species? Ecosystems are neither as tightly integrated as 
organisms nor as simply defined as populations. Interspecific and species ecosystem 
connections are often weak, or unknown, or obscured by theoretical misconceptions. 
The number of species in an ecosystem is of the order of 103, a large but not impossible 
number. However, the number of possible local pair-wise inter-specific interactions in one 
community is of the order of 106. The number of species on earth is of the order of 107. The 
number of cells in a mammal is of the order of 109 (Bonner 1988). The number of possible 
interactions among species is astronomical. If ecosystems science is strictly a study of species 
interactions it is hopelessly complex. But just as we need not consider all cell-to-cell 
interactions whenever we discuss a single organism, so we need not consider all possible 
species-to-species interactions whenever we discuss ecosystems. In fact, many questions ignore 
differences between species. Also, data about most species are non-existent or dubious. 
Recent ecosystem level theories have been concerned with food web patterns, nutrient flows, 
productivity, stability and complexity, each of which is intellectually fascinating. But 
ecologists also claim that they can help to solve practical environmental problems. The study 
of ecosystems is considered of importance for dealing with air and water pollution, fisheries 
management, species extinction and more. As research programmes become larger and more 
expensive, specific work goals are dictated by funding agencies which behave as employers. 
Ecologists are not completely free to choose their own questions. Practical questions may focus 
on commercial interests, species conservation, tourism, water potability or public health, 
among other things. Foci of interest may change during the course of an investigation as social 
needs change, new administrators are hired or elected, or as newsworthy disasters occur. 
Choice of goals and allocation of resources is often made even more complex when agencies 
with different agendas handle different parts of the decision-making processes. Questions can 
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involve scales of metres, kilometres or the globe - a puddle, a pond, a watershed (catchment) 
or an ocean. There need be no coincidence between what ecologists may believe is 
scientifically interesting and what they are requested to study by society. 
Exemplars: biological and theoretical 
It is often assumed that models are needed because the complexity of information about 
ecosystems is excessive (Allen & Starr 1982; O'Neill et al. 1986; Allen & Hoekstra 1992). 
Any simplification limits our capacity to draw conclusions, but this is by no means unique to 
ecology. Essentially all science is the study of either very small bits of reality or simplified 
surrogates for complex whole systems. How we simplify can be critical. Careless 
simplification leads to misleading simplistic conclusions (Slobodkin 1992). 
Given the enormous number of species one method of simplification is to designate 
particular species as "exemplars". These are chosen for their ease of husbandry and are used as 
surrogates for less convenient species (Slooff 1983; Niederlehner et al. 1986; Spehar & Fiandt 
1986). For example, Scenedesmus, Daphnia and fathead minnow Pimephales promelas are 
sometimes respectively designated as exemplars of algae, invertebrates and vertebrates for 
purposes of toxicity testing. Failure to damage these organisms is taken as legal evidence for 
lack of toxic effects. 
Even more curious than using biological exemplars is to simplify by use of theoretical 
exemplars which do not correspond to any organism and are nevertheless taken to represent all 
organisms. Theoretical exemplars occur when researchers construct models which do not 
mimic nature at all, but which are treated as objects of theoretical concern and even as bases 
for environmental management. A short explanatory and historical digression seems 
appropriate here. 
The study of single organisms under specified environmental circumstances can produce 
age-specific birth and death rates. These in turn can be used in calculating rates of increase or 
decrease, reproductive value, etc. It is also possible, using sufficiently short-lived and small 
organisms, to grow populations in the laboratory. The outcome of this kind of research may be 
a mathematically difficult, very specific equation which models changes of particular kinds in a 
very specific population (e.g. Gatto et al. 1989). This kind of model may be inconvenient to 
enter into an ecosystem model. 
For mathematical convenience simpler equations are used in ecosystem models. Rather than 
deal with the full range of available information about a particular kind of organism, these 
exemplar equations use abstracted general biological truths. For example, since all organisms 
die we can assume a death rate which may either be constant, a random number, or a function 
of population size or the value of some assumed environmental properties. Similarly, since all 
organisms are born we can assume a birth rate. These rates can be assumed age-independent or 
age-dependent as a matter of convenience. Since populations do not become infinitely large, 
and since populations without organisms are not particularly interesting, the functional 
relations are usually chosen so that the populations' sizes are more or less bounded. We can 
thereby discard most of the detailed information about particular populations of particular 
species, and include whatever details seem tractable. Equations in predator-prey models, for 
example, typically exclude genotypic differences but permit population sizes to change. 
Conversely, population genetic models typically hold population size constant but permit gene 
frequencies to change. 
There are many simple population growth equations from which to choose and no real limit 
on how many more can be constructed. Perhaps the most notorious is the logistic equation -
written as some modification of dN/dt = aN - bN2. N represents some measure of population 
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size, a is the growth rate under conditions of very low N, and b translates the presence of one 
organism into an inhibitory effect on the rest. Anyone who has had an elementary college 
course in ecology will recall this equation and the ways in which it has been, and still is, used. 
Due to the simplistic nature of their implicit assumptions, these equation systems, regardless 
of particular modifications, do not mimic any actual population. This inadequacy has been 
noted earlier (Verhulst 1838). 
Various modifications can be made in the values and signs of the terms in the logistic 
equation. One may deal with entire communities or ecosystems by writing a separate equation 
for each species and connecting these in various ways. The central shared feature is that the 
equations do not attempt to actually represent the biology of any particular species but rather 
they are a kind of generic representation. They are exemplars in the mathematical domain in 
almost the same sense that fathead minnows are exemplars for all vertebrates. 
So long as one is not concerned with factual verification in any detail, the logistic equation is 
remarkably convenient. Its theoretical derivatives can be pedagogically useful if carefully 
presented. Yodzis (1989), for example, provides a textbook to bring ecology students up to the 
mathematical level required for theorizing in this way. Peters (1991), having defined testability 
as the sole criterion of scientific merit, supplies arguments from which he concludes that 
ecological theorizing is intensely overrated. He believes that empirical testing is weak, or 
impossible, or wanting for most ecological theory. In fact the merits and demerits of this sort of 
model have been under scrutiny for many years (Slobodkin 1966). 
An actual description of the properties of a real population is an "existence statement". Like 
any natural history observation it is a fact that must be reckoned with one way or another. Over 
the years, empirical evidence that seemed to deny the usefulness or meaningfulness of the 
logistic equation has been presented, with apparently inconclusive effect. 
One example of the intransigence of theory in the face of facts is the analysis, over a 43-year 
period, of Daphnia population growth. Pratt (1943) claimed that populations of Daphnia 
magna, under constant conditions, showed persistent large-scale oscillations. I read Pratt with 
the preconception that populations literally grew according to a sigmoid or logistic curve. I had 
derived this opinion from the lectures of G. E. Hutchinson and the works of Gause (1934, 
1935). I had also read such statements as the one on page 309 in Allee et al. (1949): ". . . 
knowing that the population is indeed growing in a sigmoid fashion it follows that any 
disagreement between observed and theoretical points results from errors of sampling . . . (or) 
husbandry . . . unknown environmental factors; or from some biological characteristic peculiar 
to the species in question". (My emphasis added in italics.) 
I repeated Pratt's work, controlling for food supply, expecting to find that he had somehow 
forced the departure from the logistic equation. In fact, after two years of effort, my results 
agreed with his and I became convinced that the logistic equation itself was nonsense, at least 
if it was accepted literally. Allee et al. were correct in that deviation from the logistic hinged 
on biological peculiarities, but these consisted of having age structure and physiological time-
lags - just like any other metazoan. Daphnia population dynamics was explicable as a food-
limited, age-structured, time-lagged system (Slobodkin 1954). McCauley & Murdoch (1986), 
forty-three years after Pratt's paper, came to identical conclusions, and also presented evidence 
that the age-structured, food-dependent population dynamics that produced oscillations in the 
laboratory were also at work in nature. 
Analysis of Daphnia populations demonstrated the irrelevance of the logistic equation at 
least to metazoan populations, and suggested that species-ecosystem interactions might best be 
clarified by careful observation of particular species one at a time, all 107 of them. We will see 
that this gloomy prospect does abate on further analysis. 
78 L.B. Slobodkin 
How did the logistic curve survive Pratt's 1943 paper or my 1954 paper? In part it was a 
case of convenience overcoming factuality. This attitude was rationalized by Levins (1966) in 
an interesting and imaginative way. He originated the widely accepted view that "generality, 
realism and precision" of ecological theory could not be simultaneously maximized. This 
concept was not explicitly confined to ecological theory by Levins, but it was widely quoted 
and accepted only by ecologists. It did not catch on among other scientists. For ecologists it 
rationalized the predictive inadequacy of much of accepted ecological theory. Recently, Orzack 
& Sober (1993) have demonstrated that, as used by Levins, and even more so by those quoting 
him, "generality, precision and realism" do not behave in this way. Models that have higher 
"realism" very often also have higher "generality" and "precision". They also suggest that the 
three concepts, as presented by Levins, may be empirically meaningless (but see also Levins 
1993). 
Notice that Levins' defense of inadequate theory was made before computers could deal 
with complex, non-linear phenomena. Classical mathematical tools were also inadequate for 
the task. But even now, when powerful simulation capacity exists, dispute about simplified 
ecological equations, including slight modifications of the logistic equation, continues (cf. 
Matson & Berryman 1992). 
The capacity to deal with large quantities of data does not automatically solve the problems 
of theoretical ecology. Even intellectually fascinating and realistic models are not of very broad 
practical use. Most of the numbers collected by ecologists are used to feed models which might 
be useful if the world was severely constrained in its choice of questions. However, questions 
may come to ecologists from any direction. Even if the potential applicability of models is not 
limited by simplifications, the fact that the range of ecological questions is unlimited limits the 
usefulness of any particular model. The problem is built into the "subject-matter focused" 
definition of ecology. Ecologists, unlike physicists or mathematicians, or practitioners of 
"theory focused" sciences, cannot reject questions out of hand as not being within the scope of 
their theoretical structure (Slobodkin 1988). 
For example, models typically focus on temporal abundances and changes in abundance. 
This numerical information about populations tells us nothing about water chemistry, species 
composition, or causes of mortality. Unless the numbers show conspicuous trends, they tell us 
nothing about the mechanism of possible dangers. While numbers may ring an alarm, if they 
are just numbers, free of mechanisms, their value is severely limited. 
Some theoreticians of ecology still "share the common purpose of helping to construct a 
broad theoretical framework within which to assemble an otherwise indigestible mass of field 
and laboratory observations" (May 1976, p. 1). Most agree, however, that we cannot hope for 
a general theory of ecosystems which will answer all possible questions. 
Often, mathematically indigestible field and laboratory data are required in order to 
solve problems. Imagine, for example, a mammalian pest-eradication programme. Knowing 
the precise conditions that permitted breeding might very well be more meaningful than 
knowing the statistical properties of litter size over areas and years. In another example, 
precise sizes and shapes of water masses are as important as population dynamics and water 
chemistry in determining when and where Red Tides occur (Carpenter et al. 1989; Slobodkin 
1989). 
Broad general models provide no answers to specific problems but, unfortunately, even 
models replete with particulars are only useful if the questions come from the right direction. 
The most effective models are often as limited in the direction of their responses as the Maginot 
Line. 
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Using descriptive biology 
We are left with the problem of answering questions we cannot completely anticipate about 
systems of enormous complexity which we at best partially understand. Neither exemplar 
species nor exemplar equation systems will solve the central problem of how to relate single 
species to their ecosystems in a useful way, or any of the other serious problems which concern 
ecology. I suggest that the unstylish kind of ecology called "natural history", combined with 
modern computer technology, is the optimal approach to answering many practical questions 
about ecosystems. 
Focusing on the biological interactions between individual species and the ecosystems in 
which they are found may not be the only way to deal with this problem, but we will see that it 
is certainly one legitimate approach. In particular, knowledge about single species does help in 
solving almost all ecosystem level problems. 
The strength of the interaction between a particular species and the ecosystem in which it 
occurs varies enormously among species. Beavers {Castor fiber) and hermatypic corals literally 
construct and maintain their own ecosystems. At the opposite extreme may be inconspicuous 
ubiquitous clusters of prokaryotes. Some of these fail to distinguish very strongly between 
ecosystems. 
Usually, most of an ecosystem's properties persist even if one or even several species chosen 
at random were to be eliminated completely. In any case, it is generally accepted that the way 
in which each particular species interacts with its ecosystem is unique in at least some aspects. 
(This is merely a restatement of classical assertions about uniqueness of ecological niches.) 
Some species are considered important, whether or not they matter to the ecosystem in 
which they are found. The northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) is considered so 
important in its own right that a large area of the state of Washington will be managed to 
encourage its presence. The practical importance of the spotted owl does not depend on its 
ecological effects, but rather on its ecological requirements. If the spotted owls were to be 
eliminated from their "old stand" habitat, and that were to be the only change occurring, their 
prey, the flying squirrels (Glaucomys volans), might heave a sigh of relief. It would matter very 
little to other organisms other than ornithologists. If, however, old stand timber were 
eliminated that would be the end of the spotted owl. The owls are indicators of old stands. 
Given the politics and poetry of ecosystem management, the owls are a kind of safe conduct 
pass into the future for the old stand timber. (This paragraph was taken from notes on a lecture 
by J. Franklin, at Fifth Carey Conference, 1993). 
In short, the relation between studies of a single species and studies of ecosystems will vary 
with species, ecological circumstances and human concerns. Many species are neither so 
critical to their ecosystems as beavers, nor so sensitive to properties of their ecosystem as the 
spotted owl. However, the more detailed and specific the information about the biology of a 
single species or a particular taxonomic group, the more inferences may be drawn about their 
ecosystems. 
I will provide some information on how one simple group of relatively unimportant 
organisms, hydra, fits into its ecosystem and suggest what we might learn from it. (Note: I am 
using "hydra" as a common name to refer to several different genera such as Hydra, 
Pelmatohydra and Chlorohydra). We will see that simply describing the general biology of 
these animals requires constant reference to ecosystem properties, ranging from other species 
to physical and chemical properties of the environment such as light and temperature, and to 
general principles of ecosystem organization. For more than two centuries hydras have been 
sources of general biological insights (Lenhoff & Lenhoff 1986). They are among the most 
successful of freshwater coelenterates (Slobodkin & Bossert 1991). At the anatomical and 
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behavioural level, hydras are so simple that we need not deliberately simplify them 
intellectually. That is why I became fascinated by them. 
As most biologists learn at a very young age, all species of hydra look very similar except 
for size and colour. Each individual hydra consists of approximately nine types of cells 
arranged as two concentric blind sacks. The central lumen serves as a gut. The top opening 
serves as both mouth and anus. The upper edge of the double sacks form a crown of tentacles. 
Live prey are captured by the tentacles, using poisonous threads extruded from special 
capsules, the nematocysts. There is no skeleton nor other organ systems. Reproduction occurs 
either by budding off a miniature adult, or by producing an egg or a mound of sperm from the 
side of the body. Fertilized eggs may wait until appropriate conditions arise before hatching out 
as miniature adults. 
The colour difference between species is primarily due to the presence or absence of 
endocellular algae. Smaller species of hydra have green symbionts, larger ones do not. The 
mechanistic explanation for this relates to cellular control of the population of intracellular algal 
populations. This in turn depends on hormonal differences which control body size. Larger 
hydras cannot be green because the hormonal mechanism that permits large body size prohibits 
adequate control of algal numbers within each hydra cell (Dunn 1987; Slobodkin et al. 1991). 
Both brown and green hydras act as predators on some, but not all, species of zooplankton. 
When food is available the hydras eat voraciously and reproduce rapidly. One hundred Artemia 
nauplii can be eaten at one meal and new young appear at a rate of two per day (personal 
observation). I have also seen six or eight Podon or more than a dozen Bosmina longirostris 
filling a hydra's coelenteron, (Podon spp. are supposed to occur only in marine or brackish 
water, but they occur in a freshwater pond on Long Island). 
Even Daphnia that are considerably larger than the hydra can be swallowed. In this case the 
hydra turns into a thin film of cells stretched around its prey. Larger zooplankton species can 
pull away from the stinging tentacles before they are paralyzed. Simocephalus, Scapholebris, 
Anchistropus, ostracods, and perhaps other zooplankters, seem immune to the nematocysts of 
hydra (Schwartz et al. 1983). Anchistropus actively climbs onto hydra tentacles and body 
stalks. There is an amoeba, a hypotrich and a holotrich that feed on hydra. Planarians have 
been reported to feed on them, but I have never seen it. 
Excessively large food particles cannot be swallowed and excessively small ones are 
difficult to collect in sufficient quantity to permit reproduction (Gatto et al. 1989). The 
zooplankters of appropriate size that have been found to be immune to attack by hydra all 
occur near surfaces, rather than in the open water of the pond. The open-water forms like 
Daphnia, Bosmina and Podon are highly susceptible to hydra. Continuing experiments seem to 
be indicating that cladocerans which live at temperatures higher than those that permit activity 
of hydra (i.e. 25-31°C) are all edible to hydra (except for Anchistropus). That is, the 
susceptible prey do not generally occur where the hydras are found, which is what might be 
expected if hydras are important enough predators to have exerted a selective force on them as 
suggested by Schwartz et al. (1983). 
Hydras are usually found on surfaces but are not permanently attached. They become 
detached and float away when an area is excessively crowded, or when they have not fed for 
several days (Lomnicki & Slobodkin 1966). The floating pattern varies from species to species; 
the green hydras float less than the brown ones. There is also a species-specific temperature 
effect on floating rate (Slobodkin 1979). Floating can very rapidly alter the position of hydra 
populations in a lake ( Griffing 1965). Finding floating hydra therefore gives some indication 
of conditions in a pond. From the standpoint of hydra, a lake or pond is a complex geometric 
structure of temporally and spatially shifting benign and less favourable areas. Within this, 
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hydras move around, settling only where food is available. 
Given a constant supply of food and changes of water, hydras do not die. This was explicitly 
assumed by Gatto et al. (1989) and confirmed within experimental limits by Martinez (1993). 
But there are times and situations in which food is simply not available. Unlike animals with a 
hard skeleton, which are committed to maintain a specific size, the body size of hydra is 
flexible. After extended starvation they become smaller. We have recently found that brown 
hydras at room temperature continue to shrink during starvation for as much as 40 days, and 
can then feed and return to reproductive size and a normal reproductive rate. They showed no 
mortality either before or after being starved. I expect that they could survive longer in cooler 
water. In my laboratory, green hydras have survived without animal food for at least two 
months. 
Three to four weeks is ample time for a virtually complete change to occur in the 
zooplankton population of a pond. If after several weeks a sufficiently small food organism 
appears, the hydras gradually return to full body size. There is mortality among the starving 
brown animals after the first 20 days. This may be due to their small size. Shimizu et al. (1992) 
have shown that excessively small masses of tissue from well fed hydras cannot regenerate. 
My initial motivation for studying hydras was, in part, their apparent behavioural and 
anatomical simplicity and presumed lack of age structure. I felt that this would permit 
construction of a simple predictive mathematical model for their population dynamics. 
However, further information required a more complex model than I originally anticipated. We 
have produced a mathematical model which takes the biological peculiarities of hydra into 
account, and which predicts specific ecological and evolutionary responses to specific 
environmental circumstances (Gatto et al. 1989). This model requires the dimensions of time, 
food supply, reproductive rate, and food particle size. It also requires explicit discussion of 
temporal and spatial variability of food supply. In fact, by being biologically realistic it lost its 
generality, and we again demonstrated the Maginot Line type of directional fixity. It can 
answer questions that are coached in the language of hydra biology but no others. 
It is apparent that the biological properties of hydra, which are blind, decerebrate and simple 
organisms, violate the assumptions of most elementary mathematical population models. The 
general implication is that predictive models of organisms other than hydra will probably 
require a forbidding level of complexity. 
However, from careful study of even one species we may gain a general sense of how 
ecosystems are put together. Specifically, from the hydra example we infer that the tightness of 
the interaction between a species population and its ecosystem is not always the same. It has 
long been known that there are ways of partially dropping out of the system or of living in the 
ecosystem in an inactive way. There are also ways of moving in time or space by migration, or 
spore formation (cf. Chapter 10 in Slobodkin 1961). 
This infers that ecosystems are likely to differ temporally in their sensitivities to 
perturbations. (This is not a "butterfly chaos" phenomenon since essentially all organisms also 
have a way of re-entering the ecosystem; the system is being re-set seasonally). The effect is 
that any continuous time and continuous space mathematical model (even one with chaos, 
fractals or whatever tomorrow's mathematical panacea proves to be) of any ecosystem is going 
to be at best a crude approximation. 
Using information at the species level to answer ecosystem questions 
What does the presence of different kinds of hydra tell us about specific ecosystems? The 
presence of a brown hydra in a pond sample is evidence for the presence of a reasonably 
abundant zooplankton population, probably consisting of intermediate or large-size cladoceran 
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crustaceans. This in turn has implications about the probability of finding larger invertebrate 
predators, such as large copepods, and the presence or absence of planktivorous fishes, but I 
will not pursue the second-order implications. 
Active hydras also indicate that the water temperature has not exceeded c. 25°C in the 
relatively recent past. The water has certain chemical properties - particularly an absence of 
dissolved metals. If several hydras are collected, an approximation to the abundance of edible 
zooplankton can be made by noting the budding and size distribution. 
Knowing something about hydra also enhances to some degree the value of a zooplankton 
sample. It is well known that the occurrence of large cladocerans is incompatible with the 
occurrence of fishes (Brooks & Dodson 1965). A pond that has a large population of Daphnia 
sp. or Simocephalus sp. probably has a shortage of fish. One might guess that the difference 
between a fishless pond rich in Simocephalus and one rich in Daphnia might be the presence of 
an abundance of hydra. This is my guess since Daphnia are eaten by hydra and Simocephalus 
are not, and I do not know of any other differential predator on these two cladocerans of 
approximately the same size and shape. Of course there are also other competitive interactions 
between Simocephalus and Daphnia (Arditi & Saiah 1992). 
Recall Elton's trivial-sounding assertion: "When an ecologist says 'there goes a badger' he 
should include in his thoughts some definite idea of the animal's place in the community to 
which it belongs, just as if he had said 'there goes the vicar'" (Elton 1936, p. 64). It is 
important to consider this statement very seriously. The act of recognizing the vicar implies the 
existence of a church, a social and economic system that supports the role of vicar, relatively 
safe streets, etc. Logically similar inferences can be made from the assertion, "I see a badger" 
or "I see a hydra". 
In this way the presence of a well understood organism provides specific inferences, which 
are at least explicit and testable. Knowledge of the biology of an organism, even if the 
organism itself is not found, lends some significant information to the observation of species 
with which it is known to interact. I focused on hydra but the approach is a general one. 
For reasons of computational simplicity, no reasonable model attempts to answer all possible 
questions. Mathematical or computer models do not use all of the information of natural 
history, rather they choose information which is specific to their creators' goals. For historical 
reasons, and by analogy to physics and engineering, many models describe the time course of 
the numerical aspects of a simplified system. Population size, probability of extinction, 
anticipated yield of resources or steady state conditions are the typical outputs of models. The 
relevant variables are generally abundance, weight, or chemical concentrations. 
Under current circumstances, should it become of interest (i.e. should a client be willing to 
pay) to make predictions about some other variables than the ones used in a current model of 
that ecosystem, a new model must be produced. In order to construct models and apply them to 
particular ecosystems, it is often necessary to include information about the environment -
temperature, salinity, wind velocity etc., and about organisms - relative abundances of this or 
that species. Sometimes reasonable guesses are made either from past experience or after 
summarizing data from a library. Sometimes expensive time-consuming data collection 
procedures are initiated. 
Unfortunately, the number of potentially interesting questions that one might want to ask 
about ecosystems greatly exceeds the number of models one may conveniently construct. If 
there are no generally adequate formal models, how is the great mass of ecosystem research to 
be made useful for future researchers? It would be nice if a sudden flash of insight would 
automatically demonstrate that all, or most, of this vast literature could be subsumed under a 
single great theoretical insight. This has not happened. I think there are good reasons to believe 
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it cannot happen, if only because of the infinite possibilities for new questions being thrust 
forward for ecologists to answer. 
When confronted with the necessity of answering an actual question about a specific 
ecosystem we first turn to previous studies. Almost invariably these were undertaken for some 
different purpose than that of answering today's or tomorrow's questions. At least some ad hoc 
investigation will be needed. On the other hand, we do have a great deal of useful but partial 
information about organisms. Studies over the centuries have focused on their physiology, 
taxonomy, behaviour or some combination of these. The pool of information on many groups 
of organisms is reproducible and reasonably reliable. Knowledge about the presence or absence 
of particular kinds of organisms is a major tool for learning about any ecosystem, almost 
regardless of which questions are being asked. Generally, much of that information consists of 
descriptive natural history. 
Species lists 
Many species have not yet been described. Although most authorities would estimate that at 
least 15 million species exist (Wilson 1993), there are approximately one and a half million 
listed species names (D. Botkin, pers. comm. 1993). Even if a particular species captured in an 
ecosystem cannot be reliably assigned a name, there are aspects of natural history that are 
common to genera or even larger taxonomic units. 
Different ecosystems do not have exactly the same species composition. The smaller the 
fraction of species shared, the greater the expectation of other differences. Conversely, the 
closer the similarity of species lists between two ecosystems, the more effectively can 
information about one site be extrapolated to the other. 
Terms like "keystone species" or simply "important species" usually refer to how much 
would be changed in an ecosystem if that species was added or removed. It is not necessarily 
the same as how much information can be garnered from knowing that a particular species is 
present or absent. An information-rich species need not be important. The idea of "importance" 
varies with scale and viewpoint. From the standpoint of the global biosphere the prokaryotes 
have the vital role of influencing levels of atmospheric gases. Loss of all eukaryotic animals 
might not make much difference. Even most of the prokaryote species could be completely 
eliminated before gas values would be altered (Schneider & Boston 1991). As eukaryotes, most 
of us do not find contribution to gas regulation a complete definition of ecological importance. 
A partial list of its resident species is a relatively easy characteristic to determine for any 
ecosystem. This list is rich in implicit information. Ranges and variances of temperature, pH, 
soil conditions and even the names of other species likely to be encountered are all implicitly 
known, once we know the names of even a very few species found in a particular ecosystem. 
The presence of white bears tells us something about possible vegetation just as the presence of 
palm trees tells us something about the bear population. Species lists could be practically used 
to shorten the effort and expense of essentially all ad hoc studies designed to answer specific 
questions about any ecosystem . 
When this was pointed out almost fifteen years ago (Botkin et al. 1979; Slobodkin et al. 
1980) there was a remarkable lack of evident interest. I attribute this to two things. One is the 
desire for "mathematical looking" unified theories of ecosystems, partially as an aesthetic 
concern, and partially because many ecosystem scientists were trained in fields other than 
biology. Also, at that time, to have followed the recommendation of using a species list and a 
library to begin an ecosystem investigation would have required a great deal of slow legwork, 
and might have been difficult to explain to employers. I believe it still would have been 
cheaper and more effective than assuming ignorance. 
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The rapid development of computer technology over the last decade has changed the 
situation. Complexity and quantity of information is no longer an insuperable barrier. One need 
no longer prowl through cabinets of file cards. Many libraries are computerized to some 
degree. Many journal indices and abstracting services are accessible from a single terminal. 
References to available information about species on a list could be assembled in just a few 
days. That information would not necessarily directly answer the questions asked but it would 
serve as background for further investigation. 
But there is no real obstacle to building a dedicated databank for this purpose, in advance of 
particular ecosystem investigations. It is now not only possible but also feasible to construct a 
large databank by abstracting essentially all available firm information currently available for 
the million and a half species now named. (1.5 million information-rich entries is of the same 
order as that of the annual flight reservation files for American Airlines.) 
After each species name there could be listed the natural history facts about that species, so 
far as these are known. Particularly useful items would include physical and chemical 
tolerances, prey organisms, predators, and reproductive needs. Other information of almost any 
kind might be added, even though its present relevance might not be obvious. The problem is 
no longer computer space or even computer speed. There is the need to come to some 
agreement on organization of the information, but the data will be accessed by species names, 
so even that should be reasonably simple. In fact, the shortage will become the quantity of 
natural history information. 
I am not advocating the use of species names as units free of biological information in a 
statistical game. For example, I do not think that listing the names of species geographically is 
an appropriate beginning point. It is more important to focus on the tolerances and biological 
properties of individual species. Their geographic occurrences or ranges is simply one 
statement in the general descriptor. Also, if the databank is organized by species, new 
information as it is developed can be easily added to the appropriate descriptor. 
A species databank would permit immediate anticipation of the effects of some perturbations 
on ecosystems. Further investigation would be required for certainty, since it is well known 
that genotypes may vary geographically within a species. Also, more careful studies are 
making it apparent that many presently accepted species are actually groups of micro-species. 
Micro-species are not likely to show differences that would be of major significance for 
practical ecosystem problem solving but the possibility should be noted. 
Even if the question being asked has nothing whatsoever to do with any particular species, 
for example if we are asked about temperature changes in a lake, the species databank would 
be useful. The present temperature regimen can be learned by noting the temperature tolerances 
of the organisms found in the lake, with full precaution about the role of resting stages in 
permitting organisms to survive temperatures beyond their activity range. It is obviously 
possible to use thermometers over a sufficiently long time to get the same information, but the 
species databank can provide it much more quickly and cheaply. 
I therefore believe that descriptive natural history and systematics are the most valuable 
research that can be done to help in ecosystem management for the long term. They are the 
only way to provide the datapool that will permit timely solutions to ecosystem problems. 
There already exist careful natural history surveys for several areas and for several taxonomic 
groups. I am suggesting we should continue and expand these efforts. Further, the results of 
these studies must be placed in a central accessible computer. 
To collect the data and construct a usable databank from material now resident in libraries 
would be a large undertaking. Perhaps it has already begun in various governmental agencies 
throughout the world, but to be most useful it must be done publicly and the various pools of 
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information must be capable of being combined. Also there must be free general access to the 
information. Published summaries of abstracted data will not serve. 
Also, provision must be made for adding new information as it is discovered. Money and 
effort would be required to produce a species databank to be used in answering ecological 
questions. It would however be an order of magnitude cheaper than the American human 
genome or super collider projects, or the amount spent just on the space probes NASA has lost 
in the last three years. It is of equal or greater intellectual significance than these projects and 
certainly of greater immediate urgency. 
Conclusions 
How may results of ecological research be generalized? There are two customary routes to 
generalization, one of which may lead to misconceptions, while the other leads to an enhanced 
capacity to provide practical answers to practical questions. 
In the first approach one uses simplistic equations and "examplar species", both of which 
have weaknesses. Simple, often linear models which do not accurately represent any 
population are sometimes assumed to somehow represent all populations when used in 
community or ecosystem modelling. If mathematical models are too simple, even for hydra, 
what function are the simpler models intended to serve? 
The absence of sufficient information storage and processing capacity was responsible for 
the rise of this kind of simplified theory. I suggest that the entire approach of modelling and 
exemplars is outmoded and unnecessary, except perhaps for pedagogy. We no longer need that 
kind of theory. 
Natural history data can serve as useful initial information for further studies and for the 
construction of realistic simulation models built for specific purposes. Now we can use modern 
technology in combination with classical biology. Large storage capacity and rapid retrieval 
computers can hold a database which will permit essentially immediate impact of past research 
on present and future research plans. 
Knowledge of natural history will not, by itself, permit prediction of most aggregate 
properties of ecosystems but it may point to mechanisms that must be taken into account when 
ad hoc investigations of total ecosystem properties are made. It also can supply information 
about the bounds which the ecosystem properties may or may not have transcended in the 
recent past. In any case it can provide some kinds of chemical, physical, and historical 
information that could only otherwise be acquired by long and expensive geological, chemical 
or hydrological surveys. 
Natural history, which has been denigrated for decades, must become the wave of the future 
for applied ecology of all sorts including ecosystem level management and prediction. The 
apparent problem of how to transpose information on the level of individual species to the 
level of the ecosystem is a pseudo-problem. We can actually directly utilize information about 
species in constructing assertions about ecosystems. The properties of ecosystems and of single 
species interact through natural history. 
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